Files
planka/server/api/hooks/current-user/index.js
T
Daniel Hiller de4d768831 fix: close the gaps a security review found in the default install
Reported against 2.2.1 by someone reading the source. Every finding held.

**Sign-in had no ceiling.** Failures were logged with the caller's address
and nothing more. Two counters now — one per address, one per account —
because the two attacks look different: one source working through many
accounts is caught by the first, many sources working on one account by the
second, and behind a proxy only the second still means anything.

The count is kept in the process that serves the request. PLANKA needs no
Redis and the stock deployment is one container; run several and each keeps
its own count, which multiplies the ceiling by their number. That trade is
written where the limits are configured.

**The second factor could be guessed at leisure.** Six digits, and a
pending token that stayed valid for its full ten minutes however many codes
were wrong. Wrong codes are now counted on the session row — in the
database, so the count survives a restart and holds across every process —
and when the budget is spent the session is destroyed. After that even the
right code is refused and the login starts over from the password.

**Avatars, background images and favicons** checked the token's signature
and nothing else, so a revoked session, a deactivated account or a changed
password all kept working there for as long as the signature lasted, which
is a year by default. The five checks the API makes now live in one helper
that both use, rather than the shortened copy that had drifted from it.

**A link attachment's favicon** was fetched from wherever the URL pointed.
Storing a link is harmless — it is a string the user typed — but fetching
its icon is a request the server makes to an address the user chose, and
whether an icon came back reported on what is reachable from inside the
network. Server-side fetches now refuse private, loopback and link-local
addresses, `169.254.169.254` among them. The attachment is still created:
linking to an internal wiki is a legitimate thing to do, and it was the
server's own request that had to stop.

**The signing key.** Our own compose file ships `notsecretkey`, and it is
printed in the documentation — so on any instance that copied it, anyone can
sign a token for any account. PLANKA now says so on every start, and keeps
saying it, along with a key that is missing or shorter than 32 characters.
The placeholder carries the warning inline, where it is copied from.

**The backup script** wrote password hashes, live sessions, TOTP secrets and
SMTP credentials to an unencrypted archive. `BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` now encrypts
it, and without one the script says what it just put on disk. It also says
what it is — an example for the stock compose stack, not a backup concept —
and names the window between the database dump and the file copy, which no
ordering closes.
2026-08-28 20:55:54 +02:00

137 lines
4.0 KiB
JavaScript

/*!
* Copyright (c) 2024 PLANKA Software GmbH
* Licensed under the Fair Use License: https://github.com/plankanban/planka/blob/master/LICENSE.md
*/
/**
* current-user hook
*
* @description :: A hook definition. Extends Sails by adding shadow routes, implicit actions,
* and/or initialization logic.
* @docs :: https://sailsjs.com/docs/concepts/extending-sails/hooks
*/
module.exports = function defineCurrentUserHook(sails) {
const TOKEN_PATTERN = /^Bearer /;
const API_KEY_HEADER_NAME = 'x-api-key';
// The five checks a token has to pass live in `utils/resolveAccessToken`,
// shared with the routes that serve avatars and background images so the two
// cannot answer differently.
const getSessionAndUserByAccessToken = (accessToken, httpOnlyToken) =>
sails.helpers.utils.resolveAccessToken.with({
accessToken,
httpOnlyToken: httpOnlyToken || null,
});
const getUserByApiKey = (apiKey) => {
const apiKeyHash = sails.helpers.utils.hash(apiKey);
return User.qm.getOneActiveByApiKeyHash(apiKeyHash);
};
return {
/**
* Runs when this Sails app loads/lifts.
*/
async initialize() {
sails.log.info('Initializing custom hook (`current-user`)');
},
routes: {
before: {
'/api/*': {
async fn(req, res, next) {
const { authorization: authorizationHeader, [API_KEY_HEADER_NAME]: apiKey } =
req.headers;
if (authorizationHeader && TOKEN_PATTERN.test(authorizationHeader)) {
const accessToken = authorizationHeader.replace(TOKEN_PATTERN, '');
const { internalAccessToken } = sails.config.custom;
if (internalAccessToken && accessToken === internalAccessToken) {
req.currentUser = User.INTERNAL;
} else {
const { httpOnlyToken } = req.cookies;
const sessionAndUser = await getSessionAndUserByAccessToken(
accessToken,
httpOnlyToken,
);
if (sessionAndUser) {
const { session, user } = sessionAndUser;
if (user.language) {
req.setLocale(user.language);
}
Object.assign(req, {
currentSession: session,
currentUser: user,
});
if (req.isSocket) {
sails.sockets.join(req, `@accessToken:${session.accessToken}`);
sails.sockets.join(req, `@user:${user.id}`);
}
}
}
} else if (apiKey) {
const user = await getUserByApiKey(apiKey);
if (user) {
if (user.language) {
req.setLocale(user.language);
}
req.currentUser = user;
if (req.isSocket) {
sails.sockets.join(req, `@user:${user.id}`);
}
}
}
return next();
},
},
'/attachments/*': {
async fn(req, res, next) {
const { accessToken, httpOnlyToken } = req.cookies;
if (accessToken) {
const sessionAndUser = await getSessionAndUserByAccessToken(
accessToken,
httpOnlyToken,
);
if (sessionAndUser) {
const { session, user } = sessionAndUser;
Object.assign(req, {
currentSession: session,
currentUser: user,
});
}
} else {
const { [API_KEY_HEADER_NAME]: apiKey } = req.headers;
if (apiKey) {
const user = await getUserByApiKey(apiKey);
if (user) {
req.currentUser = user;
}
}
}
return next();
},
},
},
},
};
};