Daniel Hiller
de4d768831
Reported against 2.2.1 by someone reading the source. Every finding held. **Sign-in had no ceiling.** Failures were logged with the caller's address and nothing more. Two counters now — one per address, one per account — because the two attacks look different: one source working through many accounts is caught by the first, many sources working on one account by the second, and behind a proxy only the second still means anything. The count is kept in the process that serves the request. PLANKA needs no Redis and the stock deployment is one container; run several and each keeps its own count, which multiplies the ceiling by their number. That trade is written where the limits are configured. **The second factor could be guessed at leisure.** Six digits, and a pending token that stayed valid for its full ten minutes however many codes were wrong. Wrong codes are now counted on the session row — in the database, so the count survives a restart and holds across every process — and when the budget is spent the session is destroyed. After that even the right code is refused and the login starts over from the password. **Avatars, background images and favicons** checked the token's signature and nothing else, so a revoked session, a deactivated account or a changed password all kept working there for as long as the signature lasted, which is a year by default. The five checks the API makes now live in one helper that both use, rather than the shortened copy that had drifted from it. **A link attachment's favicon** was fetched from wherever the URL pointed. Storing a link is harmless — it is a string the user typed — but fetching its icon is a request the server makes to an address the user chose, and whether an icon came back reported on what is reachable from inside the network. Server-side fetches now refuse private, loopback and link-local addresses, `169.254.169.254` among them. The attachment is still created: linking to an internal wiki is a legitimate thing to do, and it was the server's own request that had to stop. **The signing key.** Our own compose file ships `notsecretkey`, and it is printed in the documentation — so on any instance that copied it, anyone can sign a token for any account. PLANKA now says so on every start, and keeps saying it, along with a key that is missing or shorter than 32 characters. The placeholder carries the warning inline, where it is copied from. **The backup script** wrote password hashes, live sessions, TOTP secrets and SMTP credentials to an unencrypted archive. `BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` now encrypts it, and without one the script says what it just put on disk. It also says what it is — an example for the stock compose stack, not a backup concept — and names the window between the database dump and the file copy, which no ordering closes.
108 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript
108 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript
/*!
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* Copyright (c) 2026 PLANKA Software GmbH
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* Licensed under the Fair Use License: https://github.com/plankanban/planka/blob/master/LICENSE.md
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*/
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// SSRF guard for server-side fetches of user-supplied URLs (link previews).
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// Rejects anything but http/https and any host that resolves to a private,
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// loopback, link-local or otherwise-internal address — so a pasted
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// `http://169.254.169.254/…` or `http://localhost:1337` can't reach the
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// internal network. When an outgoing proxy is configured, egress policy is the
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// proxy's responsibility and we defer to it.
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const net = require('net');
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const dns = require('dns').promises;
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const { URL } = require('url');
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const isPrivateIPv4 = (ip) => {
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const parts = ip.split('.').map((octet) => parseInt(octet, 10));
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if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((octet) => Number.isNaN(octet))) {
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return true;
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}
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const [a, b] = parts;
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return (
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a === 0 || // "this" network
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a === 10 ||
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a === 127 || // loopback
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(a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) || // CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10
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(a === 169 && b === 254) || // link-local (cloud metadata)
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(a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) || // 172.16.0.0/12
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(a === 192 && b === 168)
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);
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};
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const LOCAL_IPV6_PREFIXES = ['fe8', 'fe9', 'fea', 'feb', 'fc', 'fd'];
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const isPrivateIPv6 = (ip) => {
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const address = ip.toLowerCase();
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if (address === '::1' || address === '::') {
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return true;
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}
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// Link-local (fe80::/10) and unique-local (fc00::/7 → fc/fd prefixes).
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if (LOCAL_IPV6_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => address.startsWith(prefix))) {
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return true;
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}
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// IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) — check the embedded v4.
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const mapped = address.match(/::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
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if (mapped) {
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return isPrivateIPv4(mapped[1]);
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}
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return false;
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};
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const isPrivateAddress = (ip) => {
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const family = net.isIP(ip);
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if (family === 4) {
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return isPrivateIPv4(ip);
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}
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if (family === 6) {
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return isPrivateIPv6(ip);
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}
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return true; // not a recognizable IP → treat as unsafe
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};
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module.exports = {
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inputs: {
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url: {
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type: 'string',
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required: true,
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},
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},
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async fn(inputs) {
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let parsed;
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try {
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parsed = new URL(inputs.url);
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} catch (error) {
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return false;
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}
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if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
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return false;
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}
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// Egress through a trusted proxy → let the proxy enforce destination policy.
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if (sails.config.custom.outgoingProxy) {
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return true;
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}
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const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
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if (host === 'localhost' || host.endsWith('.localhost')) {
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return false;
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}
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if (net.isIP(host)) {
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return !isPrivateAddress(host);
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}
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let addresses;
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try {
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addresses = await dns.lookup(host, { all: true });
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} catch (error) {
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return false;
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}
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return addresses.length > 0 && addresses.every(({ address }) => !isPrivateAddress(address));
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},
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};
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