Daniel Hiller
de4d768831
Reported against 2.2.1 by someone reading the source. Every finding held. **Sign-in had no ceiling.** Failures were logged with the caller's address and nothing more. Two counters now — one per address, one per account — because the two attacks look different: one source working through many accounts is caught by the first, many sources working on one account by the second, and behind a proxy only the second still means anything. The count is kept in the process that serves the request. PLANKA needs no Redis and the stock deployment is one container; run several and each keeps its own count, which multiplies the ceiling by their number. That trade is written where the limits are configured. **The second factor could be guessed at leisure.** Six digits, and a pending token that stayed valid for its full ten minutes however many codes were wrong. Wrong codes are now counted on the session row — in the database, so the count survives a restart and holds across every process — and when the budget is spent the session is destroyed. After that even the right code is refused and the login starts over from the password. **Avatars, background images and favicons** checked the token's signature and nothing else, so a revoked session, a deactivated account or a changed password all kept working there for as long as the signature lasted, which is a year by default. The five checks the API makes now live in one helper that both use, rather than the shortened copy that had drifted from it. **A link attachment's favicon** was fetched from wherever the URL pointed. Storing a link is harmless — it is a string the user typed — but fetching its icon is a request the server makes to an address the user chose, and whether an icon came back reported on what is reachable from inside the network. Server-side fetches now refuse private, loopback and link-local addresses, `169.254.169.254` among them. The attachment is still created: linking to an internal wiki is a legitimate thing to do, and it was the server's own request that had to stop. **The signing key.** Our own compose file ships `notsecretkey`, and it is printed in the documentation — so on any instance that copied it, anyone can sign a token for any account. PLANKA now says so on every start, and keeps saying it, along with a key that is missing or shorter than 32 characters. The placeholder carries the warning inline, where it is copied from. **The backup script** wrote password hashes, live sessions, TOTP secrets and SMTP credentials to an unencrypted archive. `BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` now encrypts it, and without one the script says what it just put on disk. It also says what it is — an example for the stock compose stack, not a backup concept — and names the window between the database dump and the file copy, which no ordering closes.
70 lines
1.9 KiB
JavaScript
70 lines
1.9 KiB
JavaScript
/*!
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* Copyright (c) 2026 PLANKA Software GmbH
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* Licensed under the Fair Use License: https://github.com/plankanban/planka/blob/master/LICENSE.md
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*/
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// Everything that has to be true before an access token means anything, in one
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// place. A valid signature is the first of five, not the whole answer: a token
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// keeps its signature after the session behind it was revoked, after the
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// account was deactivated, and after the password was changed — and the default
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// lifetime is a year.
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//
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// It lives here rather than inside the `current-user` hook because the routes
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// that serve avatars, background images and favicons need the same answer, and
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// when they had their own shortened version of it they let revoked tokens
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// through for as long as the signature lasted.
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//
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// Returns null whenever the token should not be honoured, so a caller cannot
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// mistake "no session" for a session.
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module.exports = {
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inputs: {
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accessToken: {
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type: 'string',
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required: true,
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},
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// The paired cookie value, where the session was issued with one. A session
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// that carries an httpOnlyToken is only valid alongside its cookie.
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httpOnlyToken: {
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type: 'string',
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allowNull: true,
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},
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},
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async fn(inputs) {
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let payload;
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try {
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payload = sails.helpers.utils.verifyJwtToken(inputs.accessToken);
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} catch (error) {
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return null;
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}
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const session = await Session.qm.getOneUndeletedByAccessToken(inputs.accessToken);
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if (!session) {
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return null;
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}
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if (session.httpOnlyToken && inputs.httpOnlyToken !== session.httpOnlyToken) {
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return null;
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}
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const user = await User.qm.getOneById(payload.subject, {
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withDeactivated: false,
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});
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if (!user) {
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return null;
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}
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if (user.passwordChangedAt > payload.issuedAt) {
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return null;
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}
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return {
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session,
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user,
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};
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},
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};
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