Files
planka/docker-compose.yml
T
Daniel Hiller de4d768831 fix: close the gaps a security review found in the default install
Reported against 2.2.1 by someone reading the source. Every finding held.

**Sign-in had no ceiling.** Failures were logged with the caller's address
and nothing more. Two counters now — one per address, one per account —
because the two attacks look different: one source working through many
accounts is caught by the first, many sources working on one account by the
second, and behind a proxy only the second still means anything.

The count is kept in the process that serves the request. PLANKA needs no
Redis and the stock deployment is one container; run several and each keeps
its own count, which multiplies the ceiling by their number. That trade is
written where the limits are configured.

**The second factor could be guessed at leisure.** Six digits, and a
pending token that stayed valid for its full ten minutes however many codes
were wrong. Wrong codes are now counted on the session row — in the
database, so the count survives a restart and holds across every process —
and when the budget is spent the session is destroyed. After that even the
right code is refused and the login starts over from the password.

**Avatars, background images and favicons** checked the token's signature
and nothing else, so a revoked session, a deactivated account or a changed
password all kept working there for as long as the signature lasted, which
is a year by default. The five checks the API makes now live in one helper
that both use, rather than the shortened copy that had drifted from it.

**A link attachment's favicon** was fetched from wherever the URL pointed.
Storing a link is harmless — it is a string the user typed — but fetching
its icon is a request the server makes to an address the user chose, and
whether an icon came back reported on what is reachable from inside the
network. Server-side fetches now refuse private, loopback and link-local
addresses, `169.254.169.254` among them. The attachment is still created:
linking to an internal wiki is a legitimate thing to do, and it was the
server's own request that had to stop.

**The signing key.** Our own compose file ships `notsecretkey`, and it is
printed in the documentation — so on any instance that copied it, anyone can
sign a token for any account. PLANKA now says so on every start, and keeps
saying it, along with a key that is missing or shorter than 32 characters.
The placeholder carries the warning inline, where it is copied from.

**The backup script** wrote password hashes, live sessions, TOTP secrets and
SMTP credentials to an unencrypted archive. `BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` now encrypts
it, and without one the script says what it just put on disk. It also says
what it is — an example for the stock compose stack, not a backup concept —
and names the window between the database dump and the file copy, which no
ordering closes.
2026-08-28 20:55:54 +02:00

134 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML

services:
planka:
image: ghcr.io/plankanban/planka:latest
restart: on-failure
volumes:
- data:/app/data
# - ./terms:/app/terms/custom
# Optionally override this to your user/group
# user: 1000:1000
# tmpfs:
# - /app/.tmp:mode=770,uid=1000,gid=1000
ports:
- 3000:1337
environment:
- BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
- DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres@postgres/planka
# Optionally store the database password in secrets:
# - DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:$${DATABASE_PASSWORD}@postgres/planka
# - DATABASE_PASSWORD__FILE=/run/secrets/database_password
# And add the following to the service:
# secrets:
# - database_password
# REPLACE THIS. Every access token is signed with it, so leaving the
# published example value means anyone can mint a token for any account
# on this instance. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
# PLANKA warns about this on every start until you change it.
- SECRET_KEY=notsecretkey
# Optionally store in secrets - then SECRET_KEY should not be set
# - SECRET_KEY__FILE=/run/secrets/secret_key
# - LOG_LEVEL=warn
# - TRUST_PROXY=true
# - MAX_UPLOAD_FILE_SIZE=
# - TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN=365 # In days
# - STORAGE_LIMIT=
# - ACTIVE_USERS_LIMIT=
# related: https://github.com/knex/knex/issues/2354
# As knex does not pass query parameters from the connection string,
# we have to use environment variables in order to pass the desired values, e.g.
# - PGSSLMODE=<value>
# Configure knex to accept SSL certificates
# - KNEX_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_SSL_CERTIFICATE=false
# The default application language used as a fallback when a user's language is not set.
# This language is also used for per-board notifications.
# - DEFAULT_LANGUAGE=en-US
# Do not comment out DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL if you want to prevent this user from being edited/deleted
# - DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL=demo@demo.demo
# - DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD=demo
# Optionally store in secrets - then DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD should not be set
# - DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD__FILE=/run/secrets/default_admin_password
# - DEFAULT_ADMIN_NAME=Demo Demo
# - DEFAULT_ADMIN_USERNAME=demo
# Set to true to show more detailed authentication error messages.
# It should not be enabled without a rate limiter for security reasons.
# - SHOW_DETAILED_AUTH_ERRORS=false
# All outgoing HTTP requests (SMTP, webhooks, Apprise notifications, favicon fetching, etc.)
# will be sent through this proxy if set.
# If commented out, an internal Squid proxy will be started inside the container,
# which you can control via OUTGOING_BLOCKED_* and OUTGOING_ALLOWED_* below.
# - OUTGOING_PROXY=http://proxy:3128
# Set to true to expose the Swagger specification at /swagger.json
# - SWAGGER_EXPOSED=false
# - S3_ENDPOINT=
# - S3_REGION=
# - S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
# - S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
# Optionally store in secrets - then S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY should not be set
# - S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY__FILE=/run/secrets/s3_secret_access_key
# - S3_BUCKET=
# - S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=true
# - S3_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=
# Email Notifications (https://nodemailer.com/smtp/)
# These values override and disable configuration in the UI if set.
# - SMTP_HOST=
# - SMTP_PORT=587
# - SMTP_NAME=
# - SMTP_SECURE=true
# - SMTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=false
# - SMTP_USER=
# - SMTP_PASSWORD=
# Optionally store in secrets - then SMTP_PASSWORD should not be set
# - SMTP_PASSWORD__FILE=/run/secrets/smtp_password
# - SMTP_FROM="Demo Demo" <demo@demo.demo>
# Using Gravatar directly exposes user IPs and hashed emails to a third party (GDPR risk).
# Use a proxy you control for privacy, or leave commented out or empty to disable.
# - GRAVATAR_BASE_URL=https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/
# --------------------------------------------------------------------
# Outgoing traffic control (internal Squid proxy)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------
# These IPs/hostnames will always be blocked (highest priority)
# - OUTGOING_BLOCKED_IPS=
# - OUTGOING_BLOCKED_HOSTS=localhost,postgres
# Only these IPs/hostnames will be reachable
# - OUTGOING_ALLOWED_IPS=
# - OUTGOING_ALLOWED_HOSTS=
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
restart: on-failure
volumes:
- db-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
environment:
- POSTGRES_DB=planka
- POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U postgres -d planka"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
volumes:
data:
db-data: