Reported against 2.2.1 by someone reading the source. Every finding held.
**Sign-in had no ceiling.** Failures were logged with the caller's address
and nothing more. Two counters now — one per address, one per account —
because the two attacks look different: one source working through many
accounts is caught by the first, many sources working on one account by the
second, and behind a proxy only the second still means anything.
The count is kept in the process that serves the request. PLANKA needs no
Redis and the stock deployment is one container; run several and each keeps
its own count, which multiplies the ceiling by their number. That trade is
written where the limits are configured.
**The second factor could be guessed at leisure.** Six digits, and a
pending token that stayed valid for its full ten minutes however many codes
were wrong. Wrong codes are now counted on the session row — in the
database, so the count survives a restart and holds across every process —
and when the budget is spent the session is destroyed. After that even the
right code is refused and the login starts over from the password.
**Avatars, background images and favicons** checked the token's signature
and nothing else, so a revoked session, a deactivated account or a changed
password all kept working there for as long as the signature lasted, which
is a year by default. The five checks the API makes now live in one helper
that both use, rather than the shortened copy that had drifted from it.
**A link attachment's favicon** was fetched from wherever the URL pointed.
Storing a link is harmless — it is a string the user typed — but fetching
its icon is a request the server makes to an address the user chose, and
whether an icon came back reported on what is reachable from inside the
network. Server-side fetches now refuse private, loopback and link-local
addresses, `169.254.169.254` among them. The attachment is still created:
linking to an internal wiki is a legitimate thing to do, and it was the
server's own request that had to stop.
**The signing key.** Our own compose file ships `notsecretkey`, and it is
printed in the documentation — so on any instance that copied it, anyone can
sign a token for any account. PLANKA now says so on every start, and keeps
saying it, along with a key that is missing or shorter than 32 characters.
The placeholder carries the warning inline, where it is copied from.
**The backup script** wrote password hashes, live sessions, TOTP secrets and
SMTP credentials to an unencrypted archive. `BACKUP_PASSPHRASE` now encrypts
it, and without one the script says what it just put on disk. It also says
what it is — an example for the stock compose stack, not a backup concept —
and names the window between the database dump and the file copy, which no
ordering closes.
The filtered branch of `getByEndlessListId` applied `LIMIT` without an
`ORDER BY`, so Postgres was free to hand back any matching rows. With a
search over 64 cards the first page returned the oldest ones and a full
cursor walk reached 60 of them across 149 rows — cards both skipped and
repeated. The query now orders the way the cursor reads it.
The cursor itself is validated as ISO 8601, which admits forms Postgres
rejects as a timestamp (`2026`, `2026-W35-3`, a comma as the decimal
separator), each of them a 500 from the adapter. It is normalized before
the query, and stays a string because the equality half of the cursor
reads a `Date` as an empty constraint.
`getManagerProjectsModelArray` mapped every project manager to its project
without checking that the project is in the store, so one row pointing at a
deleted project produced a null the caller then read `id` off — taking down
the whole home view. `getMembershipProjectsModelArray` had the same hole one
level up, destructuring `board.project` before testing `board`.
The projects endpoint fed exactly that state: it derived the id list for the
included records from the manager rows, so a `project_manager` row whose
project no longer exists shipped a manager for a project missing from `items`.
Board memberships had the same gap. Both id lists now come from the records
that actually exist.
Users can pick an inactivity timeout in their preferences. A warning
appears 30 seconds before, and activity or a logout is synchronised
across open tabs.
Adds TOTP setup with QR code, login challenge, recovery codes and
trusted devices that let a browser skip the second factor for 30
days. Admins can reset another user's second factor by confirming
with their own password.
Daniel Hiller