feat: Add two-factor authentication via TOTP

Adds TOTP setup with QR code, login challenge, recovery codes and
trusted devices that let a browser skip the second factor for 30
days. Admins can reset another user's second factor by confirming
with their own password.

server/api/controllers/access-tokens/verify-totp.js

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*!
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 PLANKA Software GmbH
+ * Licensed under the Fair Use License: https://github.com/plankanban/planka/blob/master/LICENSE.md
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @swagger
+ * /access-tokens/verify-totp:
+ *   post:
+ *     summary: Complete TOTP step of the login flow
+ *     description: Exchanges a pending token plus a valid TOTP or recovery code for a full access token. Optionally remembers the browser for 30 days via a trust cookie.
+ *     tags:
+ *       - Access Tokens
+ *     operationId: verifyTotp
+ *     requestBody:
+ *       required: true
+ *       content:
+ *         application/json:
+ *           schema:
+ *             type: object
+ *             required:
+ *               - pendingToken
+ *               - code
+ *             properties:
+ *               pendingToken:
+ *                 type: string
+ *                 maxLength: 1024
+ *               code:
+ *                 type: string
+ *                 maxLength: 16
+ *               trustDevice:
+ *                 type: boolean
+ *     responses:
+ *       200:
+ *         description: TOTP verified, access token returned
+ *         content:
+ *           application/json:
+ *             schema:
+ *               type: object
+ *               required:
+ *                 - item
+ *               properties:
+ *                 item:
+ *                   type: string
+ *     security: []
+ */
+
+const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
+
+const { getRemoteAddress } = require('../../../utils/remote-address');
+
+const {
+  AccessTokenSteps,
+  TRUST_DEVICE_COOKIE_NAME,
+  TRUST_DEVICE_EXPIRES_IN_DAYS,
+} = require('../../../constants');
+
+const Errors = {
+  INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN: {
+    invalidPendingToken: 'Invalid pending token',
+  },
+  INVALID_TOTP_CODE: {
+    invalidTotpCode: 'Invalid TOTP code',
+  },
+};
+
+const setTrustDeviceCookie = (response, plainToken) => {
+  response.cookie(TRUST_DEVICE_COOKIE_NAME, plainToken, {
+    maxAge: TRUST_DEVICE_EXPIRES_IN_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
+    path: sails.config.custom.baseUrlPath || '/',
+    secure: sails.config.custom.baseUrlSecure,
+    httpOnly: true,
+    sameSite: 'strict',
+  });
+};
+
+module.exports = {
+  inputs: {
+    pendingToken: {
+      type: 'string',
+      maxLength: 1024,
+      required: true,
+    },
+    code: {
+      type: 'string',
+      isNotEmptyString: true,
+      maxLength: 16,
+      required: true,
+    },
+    trustDevice: {
+      type: 'boolean',
+    },
+  },
+
+  exits: {
+    invalidPendingToken: {
+      responseType: 'unauthorized',
+    },
+    invalidTotpCode: {
+      responseType: 'forbidden',
+    },
+  },
+
+  async fn(inputs) {
+    const remoteAddress = getRemoteAddress(this.req);
+    const { httpOnlyToken } = this.req.cookies;
+
+    let payload;
+    try {
+      payload = sails.helpers.utils.verifyJwtToken(inputs.pendingToken);
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error.raw && error.raw.name === 'TokenExpiredError') {
+        throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+      }
+      sails.log.warn(`Invalid pending token! (IP: ${remoteAddress})`);
+      throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    if (payload.subject !== AccessTokenSteps.VERIFY_TOTP) {
+      throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    let session = await Session.qm.getOneUndeletedByPendingToken(inputs.pendingToken);
+    if (!session) {
+      sails.log.warn(`Invalid pending token! (IP: ${remoteAddress})`);
+      throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    if (session.httpOnlyToken && httpOnlyToken !== session.httpOnlyToken) {
+      throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    const user = await User.qm.getOneById(session.userId, {
+      withDeactivated: false,
+    });
+    if (!user || !user.isTotpEnabled || !user.totpSecret) {
+      throw Errors.INVALID_PENDING_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    let codeAccepted = sails.helpers.utils.verifyTotpCode.with({
+      code: inputs.code,
+      secret: user.totpSecret,
+    });
+
+    let consumedRecoveryIndex = -1;
+    if (!codeAccepted) {
+      const recoveryCodes = user.totpRecoveryCodes || [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < recoveryCodes.length; i += 1) {
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+        if (await bcrypt.compare(inputs.code, recoveryCodes[i])) {
+          codeAccepted = true;
+          consumedRecoveryIndex = i;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!codeAccepted) {
+      sails.log.warn(`Invalid TOTP code! (IP: ${remoteAddress})`);
+      throw Errors.INVALID_TOTP_CODE;
+    }
+
+    if (consumedRecoveryIndex >= 0) {
+      const previousRecoveryCodes = user.totpRecoveryCodes || [];
+      const remaining = previousRecoveryCodes.filter(
+        (_value, idx) => idx !== consumedRecoveryIndex,
+      );
+
+      // Compare-and-set: only swap the array if it still matches the state we read.
+      // A second concurrent verify-totp using the same recovery code will see
+      // rowCount = 0 here and be rejected as INVALID_TOTP_CODE — preventing replay.
+      const queryResult = await sails.sendNativeQuery(
+        'UPDATE user_account SET totp_recovery_codes = $1::jsonb, updated_at = $2 WHERE id = $3 AND totp_recovery_codes = $4::jsonb',
+        [
+          JSON.stringify(remaining),
+          new Date().toISOString(),
+          user.id,
+          JSON.stringify(previousRecoveryCodes),
+        ],
+      );
+
+      if (queryResult.rowCount === 0) {
+        sails.log.warn(`Recovery code race detected, rejecting (IP: ${remoteAddress})`);
+        throw Errors.INVALID_TOTP_CODE;
+      }
+    }
+
+    const { token: accessToken, payload: accessTokenPayload } = sails.helpers.utils.createJwtToken(
+      user.id,
+    );
+
+    session = await Session.qm.updateOne(session.id, {
+      accessToken,
+      pendingToken: null,
+    });
+
+    if (session.httpOnlyToken && !this.req.isSocket) {
+      sails.helpers.utils.setHttpOnlyTokenCookie(
+        session.httpOnlyToken,
+        accessTokenPayload,
+        this.res,
+      );
+    }
+
+    if (inputs.trustDevice && !this.req.isSocket) {
+      const { plainToken } = await sails.helpers.trustedDevices.createOne.with({
+        userId: user.id,
+        userAgent: this.req.headers['user-agent'] || null,
+      });
+      setTrustDeviceCookie(this.res, plainToken);
+    }
+
+    return {
+      item: accessToken,
+    };
+  },
+};